I happened to be looking through my file of clippings when I came across a copy of the first ever wargame article that I wrote. It was published in issue No. 175 of the WARGAMER'S NEWSLETTER in October 1976, and was entitled BATTLE REPORT: THE BATTLE OF TAIPING ... and was a battle report about solo wargame set during the Sino-Japanese War.
I have reproduced this article below.
BATTLE REPORT
The Battle of Taiping
Preamble: This battle came about as a result of reading several books about the Sino-Japanese War. I possess a small Japanese Army based upon the Fujmi Japanese Infantry set and a First World War British Army suitable for use as Chinese Army units, and therefore set up the following battle. It was fought solo using my own rules which are based upon ideas by Featherstone, Sandars, Wise, and Grant. I also tried out a new idea of my own regarding major tactical decisions to remove bias in my decisions. When a major tactical decision had to be made, I wrote down 6 alternatives courses of action. I then threw a die and the number on the die was the course of action chosen.
Scenario: Several small Japanese units have been fired upon, and the local Japanese commander has decided to take punitive action against Chinese units in and around the village of Hanlow. In order to do this he has sent the following forces to Taiping, just north of Hanlow -
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, Infantry Coys.
- A Mortar section.
- A Machine gun section.
- 3 Infantry guns.
The Chinese forces in and around Hanlow are as follows -
- A, B, C, D, E and F Infantry Coys camped in the village.
- An artillery battery (3 18pdrs) by the line of trees to the east of the village.
- Sentries are at the railway bridge over the river and at the railway crossing.
Terrain: The terrain is a flat plain split be a railway embankment, which has paddy-fields to the north and south of it. A river (the River Tai) runs from north-east to south-west across the north-west corner of the plain.
The Battle: During the night, the 1st Japanese Company advance along the east bank of the river, whilst the 2nd and 3rd Companies, with the M.G. and Mortar sections moved towards the railway embankment along the Hanlow-Taiping road. The Chinese sentries were more alert than expected and were able to give a warning before being killed. The Japanese forces at the railway embankment now spead out along it, with the M.G. and Mortar sections sited to cover the road from Hanlow. The 1st Company continued its advance along the river bank after leaving a small force to cover the railway bridge.
The Chinese commander, on hearing the sentries' warnings, immediately alerted his men and dispatched A and B Companies towards the railway embankment, along the road. The Japanese held their fire until the Chinese were almost upon them, and then opened fire with all available weapons (rifles, light and heavy machine guns, 'knee' mortars, and 81mm mortars). The Chinese, who were becoming more and more visible in the growing light of dawn, now retreated to the paddy-fields after suffering heavy casualties.
In the meantime the 1st Company advanced further along the river bank and began to move into the southernmost paddy-fields. The Chinese C, D, E and F Companies now deployed towards those same paddy-fields, although unaware of the Japanese presence there. The Chinese battery opened fire on the embankment from their gun line near the trees, but only caused a few casualties on the well spread out Japanese forces there. They did, however, alert the Japanese commander to their presence, and he moved his infantry guns forward and formed a gun line to the rear of the embankment.
Using the paddy-fields as cover, A and B Companies had begun firing upon the embankment to cover the other companies as they advanced on the bridge. However, these four companies blundered into the Japanese 1st Company as it was deploying in the next field. The Japanese company commander did not hesitate in his actions and charged the Chinese, who, although superior in numbers, were shocked by the sudden appearance of the enemy on their flank. In the ensuing melee both sides suffered casualties but the ferocity of the Japanese attack had its desired effect, and the Chinese retreated towards Hanlow. The Japanese company commander, realising that the Chinese were only temporarily demoralised, and that he was considerably outnumbered, withdrew towards the river in order to make good an escape back to his own lines.
The Japanese infantry guns had, by now, moved into position and begun firing upon the Chinese gun line, who were still trying (in vain) to dislodge the Japanese on the embankment. The Japanese guns were, however, very effective, and within short time, had caused several casualties amongst the Chinese gunners. The Chinese now switched their attention to counter-battery fire, but without any observation their fire remained ineffective and wide of the target.
The Chinese commander now reviewed his situation. His artillery was not being very successful (especially in view of mounting casualties to the gunners) and although A and B Companies were in contact with the enemy, C, D, E and F Companies wee shaken after the skirmish in the paddy-fields He was also aware of a Japanese force on his flank (although unaware that this force was, in fact, retreating). He therefore decided that withdrawal was the best course he could take, and issued orders to the artillery to cease fire and move southwards with C, D, E and F Companies. He also ordered A and B Companies to slowly withdraw southward to cover the retreat. The Japanese 2nd and 3rd Companies , seeing this retreat, began to advance down the Hanlow-Taiping road, but were checked by A and B Companies long enough for the main Chinese force to withdraw, although the infantry guns were able to inflict some casualties upon the retreating force. When the Chinese finally withdrew off the battlefield the Japanese advanced and occupied Hanlow.
Conclusions and observations: The Japanese attack was not as successful as it should have been. The main advance down the Hanlow-Taiping road stalled as soon as the sentries alerted the main Chinese force. The flank attack also failed in its main purpose because of the size of the attacking force.
The Chinese counter-attack failed for two main reasons. Firstly the artillery support was bad as lack of observation made it impossible to adjust ranges, etc. Secondly the lack of reconnaissance by C, D, E and F Companies when advancing towards the railway bridge across the paddy-fields.
The battle was very enjoyable, and the new idea I tried out with regard to major tactical decisions worked quite well. An example of how well it did work is in the reaction of the main Japanese force when the Chinese sentries managed to give the alarm. I gave the commander the following 6 alternatives and then threw the die -
- Withdraw to Taiping.
- Leave a company to guard the crossing and send the rest of the troops towards the river.
- Leave a company to guard the crossing and advance wit the remainder.
- Stay put and defend the embankment.
- Continue the advance.
- Using the embankment as cover move the entire force toward the river.
The die score was 4 and this was the course of action which was followed.
By using such a system it is possible to have forces reacting to situations without bias on the part of the solo player, as long as he keeps the alternative options reasonable. I am going to use this system again in solo games as I found that it made this one more enjoyable than my usual games have been. If you are a solo player you might like to try it. Please do - you might find that it works as well for you as it did for me!
This was the first of several articles that I submitted to the WARGAMER'S NEWSLETTER and when the latter ceased publication, it directly led to an invitation from the late Dr Paddy Griffith to attend the famous Moor Park 'New Directions in Wargaming' Conference (the first ever Conference of Wargamers or COW). By the end of that conference I had suggested the name of the new organisation we created (WARGAME DEVELOPMENTS) and become the Treasurer and Memberships Secretary ... a role that I still perform some forty-five years later!